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An Economist in Government: 
Views of a Presidential Advisor 
1984 Free Market Calendar 
A Daily Chronicle Of Enterprise 
In a joint venture project with Louver Manufacturing 
Company (Lomanco) of Jacksonville, Arkansas, the 
Harding University Students in Free Enterprise 
Economics Team has launched a major six months 
project: "The 1984 FREE MARKET CALENDAR - A 
Daily Chronicle of Enterprise." 
A calendar is a record of days past and days to come. 
Since the ancient Egyptians first devised calendars to 
tabulate the inexorable passage of time, men's lives have 
been regulated by its pages. Each day, each month is a 
milestone in the passage from youth to old age. Each 
week holds its promise of struggle and reward, of ideas 
achieved and triumphs won. But more than this, the free 
market calendar is the record of the progress of our 
nation and its people, of mankind's onward march 
through the centuries to economic freedom and greater 
material blessings. 
The 1984 FREE MARKET CALENDAR offers not 
only room to jot down notes of daily affairs but also 365 
brief reminders of great enterprising events and relevant 
comments on the idea of freedom applied to the 
marketplace. One will enjoy recalling and commerating 
the stirring events, and the great men and ideas behind 
them, which have been the basis for history's greatest 
economic miracle - American Capitalism. 
Printed in blue and red ink on which stock, the 1984 
FREE MARKET CALENDAR is punched for hanging 
and measures 11" x 14" folded or 22" x 14" unfolded. 
The National Federation for Independent Business 
(NFIB) is currently reprinting portions of our calendar in 
their FORUM and INSIGHT publications. A limited 
amount of copies are available for $1.50 to cover prin-
ting, postage, handling costs. 
by Murray L. W eidenbaum, Director 
Center for the Study of American Business 
Washington University, St. Louis 
As the old saw put it, "Economics is what economists 
do." Judging by both my personal experience and ob-
servation of the work of others, I would state that the 
quotation also accurately describes the role of 
economists in government. But, since I am cognizant of 
the great variation possible in the role - and of the 
numerous factors determining that variation - I am 
content merely to describe the role of one economist 
during one tour in Washington. 
Based on my service as Chairman of the President's 
Council of Economic Advisers from January 1981 to 
August 1982, I would conclude that the role varies 
substantially over time and that it is a changing blend of 
participation in policymaking and preaching of 
economic doctrine, both within the government and to 
the public. 
It would be pleasant to report that those who 
disagreed with me were generally wrong and, if pressed, I 
might be willing to provide some factual buttressing for 
that position. Nevertheless, self-serving statements would 
not be helpful to the reader. Instead, I have tried -
albeit likely not with total success - to avoid writing the 
modern day equivalent of "An Impartial History of the 
Civil War as Reported by John Tecumseh Sherman." 
I attempt to concentrate on the process by which an 
official economist participates in the policymaking 
process. Moreover, I write this with the clear knowledge 
that few if any decisions in government policy - be they 
labeled economic or social or foreign affairs - are made 
solely or even primarily on the basis of economic analysis 
or information from economists. Yet I also came away 
with the knowledge that most questions of governmental 
policymaking - especially those labeled "non-
economic" - do contain important economic influences. 
Developing the Economic Program 
At the outset of the Reagan Administration, for 
example, the major role of the CEA Chairman was to 
participate in the development of the President's 
Economic Recovery Program. The initial tax program 
had been set during the 1980 campaign: across-the-
board personal income tax rate reductions plus 
liberalization of business depreciation allowances. Thus, 
the emphasis was on developing the initial package of 
budget cuts. My appointment to the three-man Budget 
Working Group chaired by Office of Management and 
Budget (0MB) Director David Stockman meant that a 
major part of my time and effort was devoted to 
reviewing proposed expenditure reductions and to 
convincing the department heads to go along with them. 
One Cabinet secretary was quoted as saying that 
Stockman and I constituted a "good cop - bad cop" 
routine. As someone who grew up in the old Budget 
Bureau in the 1950s it was perhaps inevitable that I 
played the bad cop. But that function was destined to 
remain with the CEA chairman in many subsequent 
connections. Surely, I came to advocate rather con-
sistently much larger budget cuts than those approved. 
The economic "White Paper" of February 18, 1981, 
entitled A Program for Economic Recovery, constituted 
a landmark in the development of President Reagan's 
economic program. That document announced the four 
pillars of the program - tax cuts, budget cuts, 
regulatory relief, and monetary restraint. It also con-
tained the economic assumptions underlying the revenue 
and expenditure estimates. 
As the person who took on the responsibility for the 
White Paper, I instantly found myself in pitched battles 
with both supply-siders and monetarists. Without 
repeating all the doctrinal disputes that occurred, I still 
vividly recall the fervor of those arguments, which at 
times bordered on the theological. In any event, I un-
derstood the role of the Chairman of the CEA not as a 
means of preaching supply-side economics or 
monetarism, but rather of helping the President develop 
and carry out his economic program. 
Thus, my insistence that a modest period of recession 
would accompany the imposition of monetary restraint 
was viewed by the supply-siders as a lack of faith in the 
instantaneous nature of the economy's response to the 
tax cuts. Similarly, my unwillingness to include, for the 
guidance of the Federal Reserve System, a set of specific 
annual targets for monetary growth left the monetarists 
dismayed. 
During this period, I felt a kinship with Lewis Carroll's 
Alice. In Through the Looking Glass, Alice says, 
"There's no use trying, we can't believe impossible 
things." "I daresay you haven't had much practice," 
replies the Queen. "When I was your age, I always did it 
for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as 
many as six impossible things before breakfast." 
Selling the Economic Program 
After the release of the White Paper, the CEA 
chairman became one of the three major "salesmen" 
(along with Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, and the 
0MB Director) for the President's economic program -
aside from the "number one communicator" himself. 
There followed an almost endless array of joint and 
individual congressional testimonies and press con-
ferences; White House briefings to the Cabinet, other 
officials, and numerous visiting interest groups; and 
speeches, speeches, speeches to all sorts of organizations 
- business, consumers, agriculture, ethnic, regional, 
religious, etc. 
I reached a point that when I was out for a meal and 
the waiters began to clear the dishes, I automatically got 
ready to stand up and speak. At first I referred to the 
speechifying as economic education and then marketing. 
Sbusequently, however, I found myself using the term 
"forensic economics" to describe the activity. I was 
defending the product that I had helped to design, in-
cluding the inevitable compromises that anyone would 
reluctantly agree to. 
In addition, since there is an important international 
dimension to economic policy, a wide array of am-
bassadors and economic and finance ministers from 
other nations frequently came by for discussions ranging 
from the courtesy call to the substantive. As chairman of 
the U.S. delegation to the Economic Policy Committee of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, I carried at times a significant 
representational load for what was a rather controversial 
set of policies. As chairman of the Economic Policy 
Committee, I had key opportunities to work with my 
counterparts in other nations to develop positions and 
draft communiques with which we felt comfortable and 
which other nations would accept. Informally, the EPC 
chairmanship enabled me at key points to unruffle the 
feathers of foreign representatives who had been upset by 
earlier, "harder line" American presentations. 
I must admit that I felt no reluctance to play the 
public role the President assigned to me - to serve as a 
senior representative of his Administration at a time 
when the approval of his economic program by the 
Congress was an essential step in converting economic 
ideas to economic reality. Thus, I did not see my public 
role as an economic "oracle" aloof from the foibles of 
any sitting administration. After all, there is no shortage 
of that type of expertise in the private sector. 
The Day-to-Day Routine 
Simultaneously, the development of a host of detailed 
government programs and policies was taking place 
inside the Administration. An important structural 
change was the institution of Cabinet Councils to replace 
the host of interagency committees that typically had 
been organized by the White House in the past. The CEA 
chairman is an active member of three of those cabinet-
level groups - Economic Affairs, Commerce and Trade, 
and Natural Resources and Environment - and attends 
the meetings of the other councils (Human Resources, 
Food and Agriculture, Legal Policy). Members of the 
CEA and its senior staff serve on the various working 
groups and task forces . 
The effectiveness of the CEA on any specific issue 
discussed by these groups depends in part on the cogency 
of its analysis. But that is not always the case. For 
example, we won the battle to eliminate import 
restrictions on shoes, but lost the struggle to contain 
restrictions on imports of textiles. Was it coincidental 
that the Congressional delegation to the White House 
urging textile quotas was led by a senior southern 
Republican who was diligently working for the enact-
ment of the President's program, while the shoe 
delegation was chaired by a prominent Northeastern 
liberal Democrat? 
The Cabinet Council system ensures that the CEA is 
represented in the decision making apparatus that 
handles a host of issues - social security, foreign trade, 
regulation of financial institutions, transportation, 
environment, energy, agriculture, etc. At key points, the 
President attends a Cabinet Council meeting and, at 
times, makes a decision on the spot. In this regard, the 
key role of the CEA was not to develop additional, brave 
new programs, but to operate a damage limitation 
mechanism. Thus, the CEA (at least in my time) was 
expected to, and predictably did, oppose each and every 
proposal to subsidize some segment of the economy, or to 
shield a specific industry from competition. At times, a 
Cabinet member proposing some additional form of 
government intervention in the economy would start off 
by saying, "Mr. President, Murray will probably give you 
a different view, but ... " 
In the case of protectionism, we did not win all the 
battles, but each proponent of additional governmental 
involvement in the private sector knew that he or she 
would have to do battle. In certain instances - autos 
and maritime, for example - we were hampered by 
Pre.sidential campaign commitments. I found myself 
grudgingly admiring a sitting President who took his 
campaign oratory seriously. 
The Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs was a forum 
in which I presented analyses of economic developments. 
Frequently, the President and Vice President attended, 
and my presentation would set off an informal discussion 
on economic policy generally. One Administration wag 
parodied a presentation of mine in the form of a fic-
titious memo from "Murray Weidenbomber". I like to 
believe, however, that my use of "economicese" was not 
quite as arcane as this parody might lead one to believe. 
Meetings, of course, are the basis - and bane - of a 
bureaucrat's existence. Surely, a major part of the CEA 
chairman's time is taken up by participating in meetings 
with other Cabinet-level officials. An important example 
is the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by the 
Vice President. Members of this group served as the 
chief "honchos" of regulatory reform, overseeing the 
operation of the executive order directing agencies to 
perform benefit cost analysis for proposed regulations 
and assigning important review responsibilities to 0MB. 
The Task Force also furnished an instance of the need 
to establish personal priorities. Regulatory relief, for me, 
was a labor oflove. As an academic, I had written on the 
subject widely. My initial tie to the President was that 
body of work, which he had drawn upon frequently in his 
radio broadcasts and columns as a private citizen. Also, I 
had chaired the task force on regulation during the 
campaign and the transition period. At key points I was 
expected to, and did, participate in setting regulatory 
policy. Yet, I knew that if I participated on a day-to-day 
basis, the time available for macroeconomic policy would 
suffer. Thus, I devoted - as does almost every CEA 
chairman - most of my time and efforts to macro 
matters. 
One administrative, yet strategic, set of meetings is the 
daily gathering of the White House senior staff, which 
the CEA chairman regularly attends. This is an im-
portant communication device, providing a ready op-
portunity to raise issues and policy questions and to push 
along specific matters. For example, an Administration 
position paper on trade policy had been drafted at one 
point, emphasizing a strong free trade orientation. 
Although substantive agreement had been reached by all 
relevant parties, the document itself was stuck in the 
Administration's paperflow. My merely noting the delay 
led to an on-the-spot decision to release this important 
document. 
Briefing the President 
Of course, the direct contacts with the President are of 
very special importance. Because I take the role of 
trusted advisor seriously, there are some matters that I 
will pass over. I do recall, however, discussing the subject 
of gold with him on several occasions, a matter that he 
had studied at some length. During the campaign and 
earlier, he had indicated strong interest in restoring the 
gold standard. As a member of the Gold Commission (set 
up under a 1980 law), I told him that I would pursue the 
matter with an open mind. Subsequently, we reported 
that the majority of the Commission opposed a return to 
gold at this time. That disposed of the matter. I see that 
episode as another example of the CEA's damage-
limitation function or the avoidance of economic harm. 
Another important function is to keep the President 
abreast of current economic developments. In addition 
to sending out a regular flow of analytic reports, the CEA 
chairman alerts the President to impending releases of 
economic news. Thus, the evening before the Consumer 
Price Index report for a given month is issued, the 
President has on his desk a memo from the CEA 
chairman setting forth the highlights. At times he will 
call for amplification. We had a pleasant - but spirited 
and extended - difference of views on the matter of 
seasonally adjusted versus unadjusted reports on em-
ployment and unemployment. We ultimately resolved 
this matter by my providing him both sets of data, 
together with suitable caveats. 
An insight into my approach to my job related to that 
less-than-momentous issue. After hearing me out fully, 
the President decided that he would use the unadjusted 
data in a speech. I then suggested a sentence to explain 
his position: "We do not live in a seasonally adjusted 
world." He promptly inserted it into his speech. 
If the Presidency is a bully pulpit, the CEA chair-
manship is a most elevated lectureship. As I look back on 
my experiences in that office, I find that I used the 
position to develop four themes: (1) economic freedom is 
closely intertwined with personal liberty, (2) business-
government relations should be characterized by Jess 
intervention by government, (3) free trade is the in-
ternational combination of these two themes, and (4) it is 
necessary, from time to time, to take a swipe at business' 
pleas for special privileges. 
The View from the Outside 
For a teacher, the rewards of service to the President 
were considerable, albeit psychic. One give-and-take 
session on national television gave me the chance to 
explain aspects of the economy to a far larger audience 
than a college professor normally can generate in a 
lifetime. Witness this excerpt from a session on Meet the 
Press on August 30, 1981: 
Question: You've talked about the importance 
of reducing inflation. How do you think that your 
tight fiscal and money policies feed through to 
fight inflation? How do they affect wages and 
prices throughout the economy? 
Dr. Weidenbaum: By setting in motion basic 
factors, . . . the slower availability of money and 
credit ... will restrain ... the pressures for wage 
and price increases that can't be supported by the 
market. 
As a result, we will see in the years ahead wage 
and price decisions which have a much lower 
inflationary potential than the actions we've seen 
in the past, because the basic external en-
vironment in which wages and prices are set is 
being changed. That is, the inflationary en-
vironment is being wound down. 
I returned to the private sector with no grand lessons. I 
came away grateful for the opportunity to speak my 
mind and to know that decision makers in government 
were listening to at least one economist before making up 
their minds. 
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